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Chapter 14
The Evolution of Public Sector Pension Plans
in the United States
Robert L. Clark, Lee A. Craig, and Neveen Ahmed
The first US states provided retirement plans for their civil service employ-
ees beginning over a century ago. The subsequent spread of retirement
plans across the states continued for more than a half a century before
all of the states had adopted such plans.1 General old-age assistance plans
predated employee retirement plans in many states,2 and state and local
governments typically developed pension plans for teachers, police officers,
and firefighters before the states extended similar benefits to other civil
service employees (Clark, Craig, and Wilson, 2003). The creation and
management of public sector pension plans in the twentieth century was
an evolutionary process, with many of the early plans for local employees
and teachers eventually being merged into single, state-wide systems, and
these were frequently merged with plans covering general state employees.
Coverage has now been extended to virtually all public sector employees in
the United States.
This chapter begins with a review of the evolution of retirement plans
from the establishment of the first state-employee plan in 1911 through the
coverage of practically all state employees. In addition, in the next section
we explore the relationship between public sector pensions and Social
Security. Following that, we report findings from a survey of state retire-
ment plan administrators, which covers past and current characteristics of
the state plans. These findings shed light on how the states adjusted their
pension plans once their employees were allowed to be covered by Social
Security. We then provide a detailed assessment of how plan characteristics
have changed over the past 25 years and highlight the differences between
plans in which workers are covered by Social Security and plans in which
workers are not covered. Finally, we present regression analysis to explain
how and why retirement plans differ across the states.
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The evolution of state employee pension plans
The first state retirement plan for (non-teacher) civil service employees was
established in Massachusetts in 1911; however, few states rushed to follow
that example. By 1916, only Illinois, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania had
adopted plans (USBLS 1916), and by 1934, only nine states had retirement
systems for general state employees (Social Security Board 1937). Recog-
nition of the need to move elderly state employees out of public service
employment, along with sincere concerns for their retirement income,
became more acute with the onset of the Great Depression. The passage
of the Social Security Act in 1935 contributed to discussions about the
need for retirement plans for public employees and how public sector
pensions would be structured and financed. Specifically, the initial exclu-
sion of public employees from the Social Security system seems to have
stimulated some states to take action and establish their own retirement
plans.
Over the next two decades or so, almost every state passed legislation
creating a retirement plan for general state employees. The US House of
Representatives Committee on Education and Labor Pension Task Force
(1978) reported that 45 percent of all large state and local pension systems
were established (or had a major restructuring) between 1931 and 1950,
and another 15 percent did so in both the 1950s and 1960s. By 1961,
45 states had established pension plans with only Idaho, Nebraska, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, and South Dakota failing to develop a retirement plan
(Mueller 1961),3 and these states subsequently developed plans for their
employees. Thus, widespread pension coverage of public employees is a
surprisingly recent development.4
As a result of a perceived anomaly of federal law, the history of state pen-
sion plans is inextricably linked to the history of the national Social Security
system in the US. At the time the Social Security system was created, legal
concerns led Congress to exclude state and local workers from the system.
Specifically, the issue was whether the Constitution granted to Congress
the power to tax the states (as well as local governments). Since the Social
Security Act required employers (in this case, the states) to remit a share of
the payroll tax, it was perceived as a tax on the states. The evolution of case
law on the matter during and following the Great Depression subsequently
rendered moot many such concerns about the exercise of federal power,
and in the 1950s, federal legislation permitted state and municipal govern-
ments to voluntarily include their employees in the Social Security system.
Because most states and many municipal governments already provided
pension plans for their workers by that date, the decision by state and local
governments to enter the Social Security system raised a series of questions
for policymakers. One was: Did those public employees who were brought
into the Social Security system on a voluntary basis pay for that privilege
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in the form of a reduction in the benefit formula associated with their
employer provided pension? We address this question in the following text.
When Congress first passed legislation permitting states to enter into
voluntary agreements with the Social Security Administration (SSA) in
1950, it allowed public employees not covered by an employer-provided
retirement system to participate in Social Security (Mitchell et al. 2000).5
Additional amendments enacted in 1954 allowed state and local employ-
ees who were covered by an employer-provided retirement plan to obtain
Social Security coverage at the election of the public employer and employ-
ees. Since coverage was voluntary under both of these provisions, public
employers who had entered the Social Security system could, if they chose,
also terminate this relationship. Thus, participation in the system was in
principle something of a two-way street for the state and local governments.
However, as part of the 1983 Social Security reforms, Congress repealed this
option; thus states could no longer rescind their decisions to participate in
Social Security. Once in the system, public employers were now required to
remain in the system.6 Finally, in 1991, Social Security coverage was made
mandatory for all state and local employees who are not covered by an
employer-provided retirement plan (Social Security Administration 2007).
By 2007, all 50 states had signed agreements, the so-called Section 218
agreements, with SSA allowing some or all of the public employees in each
state to be covered by Social Security. Even today, however, many state and
local employees still remain outside of the Social Security system. Indeed,
one estimate is that approximately 28 percent of all state and local public
employees remain outside the system (Streckewald 2005). The majority
of public employees who do not participate in Social Security are police
officers, firefighters, and teachers. The members of these groups were
typically among the first non-military public workers to receive pensions
in the United States; thus, employees in these occupations typically were
already covered by a retirement plan when Social Security was established
(Clark, Craig, and Wilson, 2003).7
There currently are seven states whose general state employees are
currently outside the Social Security system: Alaska, Colorado, Louisiana,
Maine, Massachusetts, Nevada, and Ohio.8 In addition to general state
employees, teachers and some local public employees are not covered in
these states. Furthermore, some teachers and local employees in California,
Connecticut, Illinois, Kentucky, Missouri, and Texas do not participate in
Social Security (Munnell 2005).
The status of state-provided retirement plans following the states’ vol-
untary entry into the Social Security system offers an interesting eco-
nomic and public policy experiment. Employers and employees are often
interested in allocating a portion of total compensation to retirement
benefits. If the initial, that is the pre-Social Security, employer-provided
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retirement plan supplied the optimal level of benefits given the state’s
human resources objectives, employee preferences, and the cost of provid-
ing these benefits, then the introduction of Social Security would tend to
encourage the states to reduce the generosity of their retirement benefits
and reduce the employer contributions to their pension plans. If promised
a Social Security benefit, and required to pay the payroll tax, workers would
also tend to accept a reduction in employer-provided retirement benefits
and employee contributions.
Mueller (1961) reported that when the various states began providing
Social Security coverage to their employees, eight states made no reduc-
tions in the generosity of their own state retirement plan; 15 states modi-
fied their systems slightly, but in all cases, total retirement benefits, social
security plus employer pension benefits, were greater than the retirement
benefits earned prior to Social Security coverage; another eight states inte-
grated their systems with Social Security and markedly reduced benefits
payable under their state systems.9 Although Mueller’s study provides a
useful snapshot of the impact of Social Security on public sector plans
circa 1960, because a number of states subsequently overhauled their pub-
lic sector pension plans, we sought to learn more about how the plans
responded to the introduction of Social Security by surveying state pension
plan administrators. Specifically, we asked them what, if any, changes were
made in their retirement plans when the state allowed participation in
Social Security.
Survey of state plan administrators
Ideally, a history of the evolution of state retirement plans would include
the date that each state first established a retirement plan for general
state employees, teachers, and other public sector employees, along with
the date these public employees were first covered by Social Security. In
addition, we would like to know if the plans altered the generosity of
the employer-provided benefits when participation in Social Security was
first allowed. This information has proven very difficult to find, as plan
documents (published or on-line) rarely give a detailed history of the
development of these plans. Primary and secondary sources indicate that,
initially, many state and local governments provided some type of income
relief to the elderly persons, and often legislatures and other government
bodies awarded lifetime pensions through legislative action targeted at
specific retirees (Clark, Craig, and Wilson, 2003). We also know that, over
time, there has been considerable consolidation of retirement plans in
many states, as the plans for teachers and municipal employees have been
merged into a single plan managed at the state level. Plan documents often
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refer to the dates that the most recent consolidation of plans occurred,
rather than indicating the date that the first plan covering state employees
was established.
To fill in some of the gaps concerning the development of public pen-
sions, we partnered with the National Association of State Retirement
Administrators (NASRA) to develop a survey sent to the administrator of
each US state plan. Plan administrators were asked to report the following:
the year their plan was established; whether state employees were covered
by Social Security; and if they were covered by Social Security, then to
list the first year the employees participated in the Social Security system.
In addition, the administrators were asked to explain the nature of any
adjustments in benefits or contributions when employees were first covered
by Social Security.
Administrators representing 31 of 50 state retirement plans responded
to the survey. The responses to several questions provided important infor-
mation on the development of public employee pension plans. In response
to the question: ‘In what year was your retirement system established?’ plan
administrators illustrated the slow spread of state retirement plans across
the country during the twentieth century. Comparing these responses with
other primary and secondary sources, leads us to conclude that some of
the responses (and/or other secondary sources) emphasize the date of the
last merger or consolidation of retirement plans, rather than the date of
establishment of the first pension plan for state employees. For example, in
the survey the Florida state plan indicates that it began in 1970; however,
other sources indicate that a retirement plan existed in that state as early
as 1927. Nevertheless, the pattern of development of state retirement plans
reported here is broadly consistent with the pattern of development of state
plans described earlier, indicating a surge in plan establishment beginning
in the 1930s, reaching a peak in the 1940s, and continuing through the
1950s and 1960s.
The state administrators were also asked: ‘In what year did your state first
enter into the Social Security system?’ and whether benefits and contribu-
tions to the state plan were reduced when workers were included in Social
Security. Combining the data on year of establishment with year of entry
into Social Security and whether any adjustments were made, we divided
the states into four groups:
1. Plans established prior to the state entering Social Security where
no adjustments were made in benefits or contributions to the state
retirement plan.
2. Plans established prior to the state entering Social Security where
benefits and contributions were reduced after the entry into Social
Security.
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3. Plans established after state employees were already covered by Social
Security.
4. Plans in which state employees still remain outside the Social Security
system.
In this sample of 31 states, 20 states had pension plans for their civil
service employees prior to 1950. Of these, 18 entered the Social Security
system, and of those that entered the system, 11 did not reduce benefits or
contributions associated with the state retirement plan, while seven states
reported that the plan structure was modified in conjunction with joining
the system. In addition, there were 11 states that started their pension
plans after their employees were included in Social Security, and nine of
these entered the system at the time they created their plans. It would be
logical to conclude that these states (and their employees) considered the
cost and benefits of Social Security in developing their own pension plans.
Finally, four states that responded to our survey remain outside of Social
Security and could be considered as having evaluated the costs and benefits
of Social Security and then decided to retain their own system without
allowing their employees to participate in Social Security. Thus, at a first
glance, we conclude that state plan administrators, legislatures, and public
employees have considered the implications of being participants in Social
Security and adjusted their own plans accordingly, and that their responses
were quite diverse.
Evolution of plan characteristics covering state
employees
The development of state employee pension plans after 1911 includes the
establishment of pension plans for state workers by every state, and the
structural modification of many of these plans as retirement systems for
teachers and local employees were often merged into plans for general
state employees. The extension of Social Security to public employees on
a voluntary basis beginning in 1951 resulted in a wave of states deciding
to allow their employees to be covered by Social Security. As noted earlier,
many states altered their pension plans by reducing benefits and contri-
butions to their own retirement plan or by integrating the state plan with
Social Security. By the mid-1970s, these structural changes in the retirement
systems of the various states appeared to have run their course. Yet, over
the next 25 years, important plan characteristics continued to evolve, as
public pensions generally became more generous in terms of benefits and
allowed earlier retirement. This section describes the current status of state
retirement plans and how they have evolved over the last two decades.
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Despite the 30-year trend among private sector employers away from
DB plans and toward a greater emphasis on DC plans, DB plans remain
the dominant type of retirement plan in the public sector. In 2007, the
US General Accounting Office reported that with the exception of Alaska
and Michigan, all states offered DB plans as their primary retirement
plan for general state employees.10 In addition, two states, Indiana and
Oregon, had adopted primary plans that included components of both
DB and DC plans, and Nebraska had established a cash balance plan
for its employees. In addition to their primary retirement plan, every
state offered its employees the opportunity to participate in voluntary DC
plans such as 403(b) or 457(b) plans. In contrast to the private sector,
public employers often do not match employee contributions. Only 12
states match employee contributions to DC plans up to a specified limit
(GAO 2007).11
The contrast between public and private plans sheds light on the history
of public plans in the past few decades. Clark and McDermed (1990) argue
that much of the early movement away from DB plans in the private sector
was caused by two factors: one was the cost of government regulations,
and the other was the structural changes in the economy that resulted
in shifts away from industries that had traditionally used DB plans as an
important human resource policy. In particular, the decline in employment
in integrated manufacturing processes that benefited from low turnover,
and the rise of service industries that valued labor mobility, helped drive
down the share of the private sector labor force covered by a DB plan. These
trends simply did not have the same effect on public sector employers.
Similarly, Munnell, Haverstick, and Soto (2007) attribute the staying power
of DB plans in public sector to differences in the labor force and regulatory
environment facing public employers. Furthermore, they argue that the
workforce in the public sector is older, more risk averse, less mobile, and
more unionized than the private sector labor force. In addition, state and
local governments do not face the same pressures on administrative costs
and other requirements associated with government regulation of pensions
in the private sector.12
There exists no detailed history documenting the improvements in state
retirement benefits since the mid-1970s; nevertheless, several secondary
sources provide useful snapshots that reveal changes in those plans over the
last three decades. One problem in comparing these and similar snap shots
is that the data sources are different, and the number and type of plans also
vary across the reports. For example, in 1978, the Pension Task Force Report
on Public Employee Retirement System (US House of Representatives 1978)
estimated that retirement plans within state-administered systems, in which
workers were included in Social Security, yielded average replacement rates
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of 45 percent for workers with 30 years of service in plans that were not
integrated with Social Security. Similar workers who were not covered by
Social Security received replacement rates that were about 57 percent of
final earnings. These estimates imply a generosity parameter (percent of
average salary per year of service) of about 1.5 percent per year of service
for workers covered by Social Security and 1.9 percent per year of service
for those outside the Social Security system.
Between 1988 and 1998, the Bureau of Labor Statistics published four
surveys of employee benefits provided by state and local governments. The
BLS Bulletin No. 2309 (USBLS 1988) reports that in 1987 the replacement
rate for retirees who had 30 years of service and average earnings of $35,000
was 48.6 percent for retirees who were covered by Social Security and 61.6
percent for retirees from public employers who were not included in the
Social Security system. USBLS Bulletin 2477 (USBLS 1996) reports that in
the average replacement rates had risen to 51.0 for Social Security covered
retirees and 62.6 for retirees without Social Security coverage. These values
imply that the mean generosity parameter for public employees included
in Social Security increased from 1.6 to 1.7 percent of final salary per year
of service between 1988 and 1996. In contrast, the generosity parameter for
public employees not in Social Security also rose slightly from 2.05 to 2.1
percent of salary per year of service.
More recently, Brainard (2007, 2009) reports median retirement benefit
multipliers of 1.85 percent per year of service for Social Security covered
workers and 2.20 percent for employees who are not covered by Social
Security. These values imply a further increase in replacement rates for
the retiree with 30 years of service to 55.5 for those with Social Secu-
rity coverage and 66 percent for those who were not covered by Social
Security. These three data sources indicate that the generosity of public
pension plans was increased between the mid-1970s and 2007. A worker
with 30 years of service retiring in 2007 could expect a replacement rate
approximately 10 percentage points higher than a similar worker retiring in
1977.
A more comprehensive assessment can be made by comparing the
replacement rate provided to employees under the same state plan at
different points in time. Since 1982, the Wisconsin Legislative Council
has collected information on the benefit characteristics of 85 large public
pension plans, including the plans that cover general state employees in
all 50 states (Wisconsin Legislative Council various years). To examine
the changes in benefit formulas and contributions over the past quarter
century, we reviewed the information contained in the Comparative Study
of Major Public Employee Pension Systems compiled by the Wisconsin
Legislative Council (various years). These reports have been published
biannually covering the years 1982 to 2006. We have also examined the
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latest information on the websites of the various state employee retirement
plans to supplement the 2006 Wisconsin data.
Table 14-A1 presents information from state retirement plans in 1982 on
the normal retirement age specified in the plan, the number of years used
to determine the final salary average, and the retirement multipliers in the
benefit formula. These values are then contrasted with the data for 2006
to show how state employee retirement plans have evolved over the past 25
years. In general, the states have substantially increased the generosity of
their pension plans over the years. Thirty-three states modified the normal
retirement ages specified in the plans that allowed workers to retire at ear-
lier ages with fewer years of service; while six states increased their normal
retirement ages (NRA) somewhat, including Minnesota, which linked the
NRA for state retirement benefits to the NRA for Social Security. Fifteen
states reduced the number of years in the averaging period, thus raising
final pension benefits; while only Alaska increased the number of years
in its averaging period. Finally, 30 states increased the multipliers and/or
eliminated Social Security offsets, and four states reduced the multipliers
used to calculate retirement benefits. As a result of these changes, holding
other factors constant, the typical state employee will retire with a higher
replacement ratio in 2006 than in 1982.
To evaluate the impact of these changes, we have calculated the replace-
ment rates in each state for a hypothetical worker retiring at age 65 with
20 years of service. The mean replacement rate in 1982 for plans in the
seven states outside the Social Security system was 44.4 percent. By 2006,
the mean replacement rate for these same states had increased to 47.9
percent. The rates for 30-year employees were 65.5 percent in 1982 and
73.0 percent in 2006. In contrast, the median replacement rates for states
whose employees with 20 years of service who were also covered by Social
Security were lower: 32.1 percent in 1982 and 37.3 percent in 2006. The
rates for 30-year employees were 48.2 percent in 1982 and 58.2 percent
in 2006. Interestingly, the increase in the median replacement was greater
during this period for states outside the Social Security system, even though
the 1983 amendments to Social Security resulted in a reduction in Social
Security benefits for future retirees.
Overall, 39 states increased the 30-year replacement rate for their work-
ers; while in seven states, the 30-year replacement rates remained constant.
Only one state, Florida, had a decline in its 30-year replacement rate. In
these calculations, the increase in the median replacement rate for retirees
from state governments results from two factors: one is an increase in the
generosity factor in the benefit formulas, and the other is the reduction
in the number of years used to determine final salary average. States also
made their retirement plans more generous by allowing workers to retire
at earlier ages. Figure 14-1 shows the distribution of income replacement
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Figure 14-1 Mean income replacement rates, state pension plans, by years of ser-
vice, 1982 and 2006. Note: Figures are the mean annual replacement rates of state
employee pensions for workers retiring in 1982 or 2006, with 10, 20, and 30 years
of service. Source: Authors’ calculations from state retirement plan websites and
Wisconsin Legislative Council (1982 and 2006).
rates by years of service and year. The chart illustrates the increase in mean
replacement rates as year of service increase and the across the board
increase in benefits between 1984 and 2006.
In addition we have divided the replacement rate figures by Social Secu-
rity coverage. Figure 14-2 illustrates the difference in replacement rates
for state workers covered by Social Security and those not covered, in
1982. Similarly, Figure 14-3 illustrates the same differences for 2006. Taken
together the figures show the extent to which replacement rates increase
with job tenure and the absence of Social Security coverage, as well as
the overall increase between 1982 and 2006. Furthermore, they show the
increase in replacement rates between 1982 and 2006 for workers not
covered by Social Security relative to those who were covered.
Other important characteristics of DB pension plans that influence the
cost of the plan to the employer and the value to the employee include
the vesting requirements and the contribution rates. Table 14-A2 reports
these values for the state retirement plans in 1984 and 2006.13 In 1984,
25 states imposed a 10-year vesting standard; 19 states had 5-year vesting;
five states imposed vesting standards of four or eight years; and Wiscon-
sin had immediate vesting. Over the intervening two decades, vesting
standards were reduced by 17 states. In 2006, only 10 states imposed
10-year vesting compared to 28 with 5-year vesting. Ten states had vest-
ing requirements of fewer than five years, and two states still had 8-year
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Figure 14-2 Mean income replacement rates of state pension plans, by social
security coverage, 1982. Note: Figures are the mean annual replacement rates of
state employee pensions for workers (with and without Social Security coverage)
retiring in 1982 with 10, 20, and 30 years of service. Source: Authors’ calcula-














Figure 14-3 Mean income replacement rates of state pension plans, by social
security coverage, 2006. Note: Figures are the mean annual replacement rates of
state employee pensions for workers (with and without Social Security coverage)
retiring in 2006 with 10, 20, and 30 years of service. Source: Authors’ calcula-
tions from state retirement plan websites and Wisconsin Legislative Council (1982
and 2006).
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vesting. The decline in the vesting period also represents an increase in the
generosity of these plans.
Table 14-A2 also presents the employee and employer contribution rates
for 1984 and 2006 for each state retirement plan. Over the past two decades
20 states increased employee contribution rates while eight reduced them.
Using a survey of plan administrators, Brainard (2007) reports that the
median employee contribution rates remained stable between 2002 and
2006. The employee contribution rate for states with Social Security cover-
age was 5.0 percent, and the contribution rates for employees that were not
part of Social Security was 8.0 percent.
Explaining the variation of retirement benefits
across state pension plans
Economists agree that the decision by an employer to offer a pension plan
depends on employee preferences for current compensation relative to
deferred compensation; the cost of providing a dollar of future income
compared to receiving a dollar today; and how the pension might influ-
ence worker turnover and retirement rates. In the private sector, some
companies offer pension plans but many do not; some employers provide
DB plans, but most now use DC plans, and some firms have generous
plans while others provide relatively low retirement benefits. Competitive
pressures help sort workers and firms into the most desirable matches.
In the public sector, all states offer retirement plans to their employees,
and virtually all states have established and continue to maintain DB plans.
Thus, there is much more homogeneity across the retirement plans offered
by state governments; however, these plans still vary substantially in their
generosity.
In this section, we attempt to explain differences in the replacement
rates that career state employees will achieve, depending on their state of
employment, and how these differences have evolved over time. Our efforts
are limited by the limited number of states, only 50 in total (as well as the
multi-collinearity in many of the factors that likely impact the level of ben-
efits that state political leaders wish to provide the employees of the state).
We estimate a rather simple model of the determinants of the generosity of
state retirement plans. Research on employee compensation suggests that
any such model should consider including: measures of a state’s population
growth; the financial condition of the state’s pension fund; an indicator of
collective bargaining strength of public employees; and the plan’s connec-
tion or lack of connection to Social Security (see Clark, Craig, and Wilson
[2003]; Craig [1995]; Fishback and Kantor [1995], [2000]; Gruber and
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Krueger [1991]; Moore and Viscusi [1990]; and Munnell [2005]). Institu-
tional factors also suggest that the overall level of coverage of a public sector
plan might influence the generosity of benefits. Given the data limitations,
the model we estimate is:
Replacement Ratei = · + ‚1PopulationGrowthi + ‚2FundingRatioi
+ ‚3Unioni + ‚4SocialSecurityi
+ ”‚ j Plani j + εi , (14.1)
where Replacement Ratei is the income replacement rate for a repre-
sentative worker with 20 years of service in the ith state pension plan;
PopulationGrowthi is the average annual compounded rate of population
growth during the most recent 10-year period in the ith state; FundingRatioi
is the ratio of pension plan assets to annual benefit expenditures in the ith
state pension plan; the variable Unioni is the share of the public sector
employment covered by a collective bargaining agreement in the ith state;
the term SocialSecurityi is a dummy variable that takes on the value one if
the workers in the ith state plan are covered by Social Security, zero other-
wise; and the Plani j terms are dummy variables that take on the value one
for, respectively, plans that cover only general state employees, plans that
cover state employees and teachers, plans that cover state employees and
local public employees, and plans that cover all three groups of employees;
zero otherwise.14
We anticipate that the population growth and union variables will have
positive coefficients in the estimated equation shown earlier. Population
growth serves as a proxy for the overall economic climate of the state in
question, and the union variable reflects the collective bargaining strength
of the state’s public sector workers. In addition, the signs on the pension
funding ratio and the Social Security dummy variable should be negative.
Pension plans with large liabilities relative to assets may have reached that
level of funding due to relatively high replacement rates (Mitchell and
Smith 1994). With respect to participation in Social Security, economic
theory suggests that workers excluded from Social Security will tend to
receive a compensating differential in the form of a higher replacement
rate from their employer pension.
To estimate equation (14.1), we constructed a data set that includes the
income replacement rate relative to the last year of earnings, which was
calculated for a hypothetical worker in each state utilizing plan charac-
teristics reported in the Wisconsin Legislative Council’s Comparative Study
of Major Public Employee Retirement Systems, published biannually from 1982
through 2006 (Wisconsin Legislative Council various years). In addition, to
supplement the Study, we obtained information from the Web sites of each
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of the state plans. Key plan parameters used to calculate the replacement
rates included the number of years used to calculate the final average
salary, the generosity parameter, and the normal retirement age. The Social
Security variable was also constructed from these sources.
In order to construct the replacement ratio for the hypothetical worker,
we assumed that this worker had annual earnings of $50,000 in the fifth year
before retirement, and this salary was increased by 3 percent per year until
retirement, assumed to occur at age 65. The annual benefit for this worker
is calculated under three different assumptions related to years of services;
these are 10, 20, and 30 years of services. Finally, the replacement ratio is
calculated under the previous assumptions using the benefit formulas for
each state retirement plan for those states with DB plans. Other types of
plans are excluded.15
As for the other variables, the population growth variables were cre-
ated from data supplied by the Statistical Abstract of the United States (US
Department of Commerce various years). Data for the construction of
the funding ratio are from the Census Bureau’s Census of Governments:
Employee Retirement Systems of State and Local Governments (US Department
of Commerce 2004),16 and the unionization variable is from Hirsch an
Macpherson (2007).17 Table 14-1 contains means and standard deviations
of the independent variables.
Estimation results for three versions of equation (14.1) are shown in
Table 14-2. The first column contains the estimated coefficients for 1982
and the second column contains the results for 2006. The third col-
umn reports the findings from a pooled regression that includes observa-
tions from both years and interaction dummy variables indicating 2006.
Table 14-1 Descriptive statistics, means, and standard deviations of
independent variables
Independent Variable 1982 2006
Population growth (%) 1.28 (1.08) 0.97 (0.82)
Pension funding ratio 18.52 (7.57) 19.99 (4.97)
Percent of government labor force
unionized
40.90 (16.39) 38.53 (16.91)
Covered by Social Security 0.7763 (0.4195) 0.7763 (0.4195)
Plan includes state workers only (State
dummy)
0.1447 (0.3542) 0.1447 (0.3542)
Plan includes state workers and teachers
(State and teacher dummy)
0.0395 (0.1960) 0.0395 (0.1960)
Plan includes state and local employees
(State and local dummy)
0.1842 (0.3902) 0.1842 (0.3902)
Source : Authors’ compilations of state retirement system data; see text.
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Table 14-2 Multivariate models of replacement ratios for state and local
employees, with 20 years of service, 1982 and 2006
Independent 1982 2006 Pooled with
Variable 2006 interactions
Intercept 39.28∗∗∗ (4.41) 50.59∗∗∗ (5.78) 44.14∗∗∗ (3.60)
Population growth 2.48∗∗∗ (0.85) 1.66 (1.18) 2.05∗∗ (0.88)
Pension funding ratio −0.22∗∗ (0.11) −0.15 (0.21) −0.27∗∗ (0.12)
Percent of government
labor force unionized
0.09∗ (0.05) −0.11∗ (0.06) 0.05 (0.05)
Covered by Social Security −8.33∗∗∗ (2.42) −10.40∗∗∗ (2.68) −9.65∗∗∗ (0.02)
Plan includes state workers
only (State dummy)
−1.69 (2.36) 4.53∗ (2.61) −2.65 (2.48)
Plan includes state workers
and teachers (State and
teacher dummy)
−1.85 (3.62) 0.49 (3.94) −2.38 (3.91)
Plan includes state and
local employees (State
and local dummy)
0.58 (2.11) 4.60∗ (2.38) −0.25 (2.22)
Pop growth times 2006
dummy
– — −0.38 (1.41)
Funding ratio times 2006
dummy
– – 0.32∗ (0.19)
% Govt LF union times
2006 dummy
– – −0.13∗∗ (0.06)
Social security coverage
times 2006 dummy
– – 0.49 (3.28)
State dummy times 2006
dummy
– – 7.61∗∗ (3.40)
State and teacher dummy
times 2006 dummy
– – 2.93 (5.39)
State and local dummy
times 2006 dummy
– – 5.25∗ (3.06)
R2 (adj) 0.4105 0.2951 0.378
F 5.48∗∗∗ 3.75∗∗∗ 4.95∗∗∗
N 46 47 92
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗–The probability of obtaining the resulting test
statistic this large when the null hypothesis of ‚ = 0 is true, is less than .10; ∗∗ less than .05;
and ∗∗∗ less than .01.
Source : Authors’ analysis of state retirement system data; see text.
In general, in the 1982 regressions, the signs of the coefficients are con-
sistent with our expectations, as discussed earlier. A growing economy,
as measured by population growth puts upward pressure on the replace-
ment rate provided by the state retirement plan. The estimated coefficient
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indicates that a 1 percentage point increase in the population growth
rate per year is associated with a 2.5 percentage point increase in the
replacement rate. While this might seem like a large impact, the reader
should note that the mean annual population growth rate among the states
is only 1.4 percent per year so an increase of 1 percentage point represents
a substantial increase in the rate of growth of a state’s population.
As noted earlier, lower funding ratios reflect the higher costs associated
with more generous retirement plans. The estimated coefficient on the
fund ratio in the 1982 regression indicates that a reduction in the ratio
of pension fund assets to annual expenditures of one year of pension costs
is associated with a 0.22 percentage point increase in the replacement rate.
The share of the government labor force that is unionized is expected
to lead to higher compensation and more generous retirement benefits.
The estimated union effect has the expected positive sign in 1982 as a 1
percentage point increase led to a 0.09 percentage point increase in the
replacement rate. In general, participation in Social Security is expected
to be associated with less generous employer provided retirement plans.
The Social Security coefficient in the 1982 regression has the expected
negative impact on the replacement rates from a public sector retirement
plan. Controlling for the other variables in the equation, inclusion in Social
Security reduced the replacement rate from a state plan by 8.3 percentage
points.
With one notable exception, the results for the 2006 regressions are
qualitatively similar to those for 1982. The key difference is in the sign
of the coefficient on the share of the government labor force unionized;
a 1 percentage point increase in the unionized share of the government
labor force led to a 0.11 percentage point decrease in the replacement rate.
Interestingly, a regression of this union variable on either the population
growth or the funding ratio variables yields a negative and statistically
coefficient. Thus it appears that by 2006, having a large share of the state’s
public sector work force in a union was a proxy for slow population (and
economic) growth and pension finance problems. In short, the union
variable may have switched from being an indicator of bargaining strength
and larger pension benefits to an indicator of overall economic weakness.
In addition, in the 2006 model, two of the variables indicating the coverage
of public sector workers have positive and statistically significant impacts on
replacement rates. The estimated coefficients on these variable suggest that
when state employees are in a separate plan, that is, a plan that does not
include teachers or teachers and local government employees, they receive
replacement rates that are 4.5 percentage points higher than comparable
workers in combined state, teacher, and local plans.
The results in Table 14-2 suggest some quantitative difference between
the factors that explain the replacement rates in 1982 and 2006. To further
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test the possibility that the influence of these variables changed over time,
we pool the observations from 1982 and 2006 and then created a dichoto-
mous variable that takes the value one for 2006, zero otherwise. The 2006
indicator variable is multiplied times each of the explanatory variables in
the basic equation. The results for the pooled sample are shown in the
final column of Table 14-2. The estimated coefficients on the explanatory
variables themselves are similar to those shown in columns 1 and 2 of the
table. The interaction terms indicate whether the effect of the variables
is significantly different in 2006 compared to 1982. As expected given
the result in columns 1 and 2, the analysis finds significant differences in
the 2006 impact of the funding ratio and the share of public sector work
force that is unionized. In addition, the inclusion of the interaction terms
yield positive impacts on a number of the plan-type variables, suggesting
that these particular plans experienced an increase in their replacement
rates over time compared to plans covering state and local employees plus
teachers—that is, the omitted dummy variable.
Finally, we are interested in exploring the change in the replacement
rates between 1982 and 2006, as reflected in Figures 14-1 through 14-3. In
Table 14-3, we employ the same variables from equation (14.1) to explain
the change in replacement rates between the two years. The coefficient on
the union variable is the only statistically significant non-dummy variable,
and it suggests that, as we noted earlier, a heavily unionized public sector
labor force has had a negative impact on the generosity of state pension
Table 14-3 Explanation of the percentage change in replacement ratios for
state employees with 20 years of service, between 1982 and 2006
Independent Variable
Intercept 10.00∗∗ (4.68)
Population growth −0.08 (0.97)
Pension funding ratio −0.10 (0.17)
Percent of government labor force (Unionized) −0.17∗∗∗ (0.05)
Covered by social security −0.17 (2.17)
Plan includes state workers only 6.26∗∗∗ (2.12)
Plan includes state employees and teachers 0.23 (3.20)




Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗–The probability of obtaining the resulting
test statistic this large when the null hypothesis of ‚ = 0 is true, is less than .10; ∗∗ less
than .05; and ∗∗∗ less than .01.
Source : Authors’ analysis of state retirement system data; see text.
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funds over the past 25 years. A greater unionized share of the state’s public
sector labor force has reduced the rate of improvement in public sector
pension benefits, holding other variables constant.
Conclusion
This discussion provides a brief history of the development of state retire-
ment plans since the first plan was established early in the twentieth century
and analyzes their subsequent changes, particularly during recent decades.
The adoption of retirement plans for general state employees moved rather
slowly during the first third of the century but with the passage of Social
Security in 1935 which excluded public sector employees, many states
began to establish their own retirement plans. However, the final states
plans were not established until the 1960s. The relationship of these state
retirement plans with Social Security is a story unto itself, and we have
attempted to provide the basic outline of the response of states to the
changing rules associated with the inclusion of public employees into the
Social Security system.
Once established, public retirement plans have been merged with those
for teachers and local employees in many states, and these consolidated
plans are now the norm, although many states continue to offer retirement
plans only for general state employees. The main story of the past three
decades has been the increased generosity of state retirement plans. States
have reduced the normal retirement age, increased the generosity parame-
ters, and reduced the number of years in the averaging period. As a result,
replacement rates have risen significantly. The history we provide may raise
concerns for the sustainability of the current generosity of state retirement
plans, especially in light of the emergence of very large unfunded liabilities
associated with retiree health benefit plans that are provided by most states.
Finally, we have attempted to explain the variation in benefits across
state retirement plans and how these differences have changed during the
last 25 years. We draw the reader’s attention to four key findings. First,
our analysis indicates that a state’s population and economic growth has
led states to be more generous with their public sector pension plans.
States that have seen their populations grow dramatically have tended to
increase the replacement ratios that career workers can achieve. Second,
we find that the funding status of state retirement plans has a negative
impact on the generosity of the state’s public sector pension plans. The
logic of this finding is reasonably straightforward. Some states have well-
funded plans in part because, relative to their less-well-funded peers, they
pay smaller pensions. Third, the impact of public sector unionization
on the generosity of the states’ public sector pension plans has changed
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over time. In the early 1980s, unionization still had a positive impact on
income replacement rates, presumably reflecting the greater bargaining
power associated with a greater incidence of unionism in the public sector.
Swings in unionization of only a few percentage points had relatively large
implications for the differences in plan generosity. However, by 2006, the
union effect had changed its sign. Today, the extent of unionization among
public sector workers has a negative impact on the state’s replacement
rate.
Finally, we find that participation in Social Security reduced the typical
worker’s replacement rate from their state retirement plan by around 8
percentage points. Whether this is a large or small cost for participation
in Social Security depends on any reduction in employee contributions to
the state plan for those workers covered by Social Security and the overall
benefits associated with Social Security coverage relative to the size of the
payroll tax.
Table 14-A1 Benefit formulas and retirement ages for state employee pension
plans, by state, 1982 and 2006
State NRAf Averaging Period g Benefit Formula h
Alabamab
1982 60(10); 30 yrs 3 2.0125
2006 60(10); 25 yrs 3 2.0125
Alaskab, e
1982 55(5); 30 yrs 3 2.0
2006 60(5); 30 yrs 5 2.0 1st 10 yrs; 2.25
2nd 10 yrs; 2.5 20
plus
Arizonac
1982 65; 62 (10); 60 (25) 5 2.0
2006 65; 62 (10); R80 3 2.1 1st 20 yrs; 2.15
next 5; 2.2 next 5;
2.3 over 30
Arkansasb
1982 65 (10); 55 (35) 5 1.625 with SS offset;
limit 100% of FAS
including SS
2006 65 (5); 28 yrs 3 2.0
Californiab
1982 60 (5) 5 2.418 with SS offset
2006 55(5) 1 2.0 at 55; 2.5 at 63
(cont.)
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Table 14-A1 (Continued)
State NRAf Averaging Period g Benefit Formula h
Coloradoc,e
1982 60 (20); 55 (30); 65 (5) 3 2.5 1st 20 yrs; then
1.0; limit 70% FAS
2006 65 (5); 55 (30); R80 3 2.5; limit 100% FAS
Connecticuta
1982 55 (25); 65 (10); 70 (5) 3 2.0; limit 75% FAS
2006 62 (10); 60 (25) 3 1.83 with SS offset
Delawared
1982 62 (10); 60(15); 30 yrs 5 1.6; limit 75% FAS
including SS
2006 62 (5); 60 (15); 30 yrs 3 1.85
Floridac
1982 62 (10); 30 yrs 5 1.68, limit 100% FAS
2006 62 (6); 30 yrs 5 1.68
Georgiaa
1982 65; 30 yrs 2 1.5
2006 60 (10); 30 yrs 2 2.0; limit 90%
earnings
Hawaiic
1982 55 (5) 5 2.0
2006 62 (5); 55 (30) 3 2.0
Idahoc
1982 65 (5); 60 (30) 5 1.67
2006 65 (5); R90 3.5 2.0; limit 100% FAS
Illinoisa
1982 60 (8); 35 yrs 4 1.0 1st 10 yrs
increasing to 1.5
after 30 yrs; limit
75% FAS
2006 60 (8); R85 4 1.67; limit 75% FAS
Indianab
1982 65 (10) 5 1.1 plus money
purchase
2006 65 (10); 60 (15); R85 5 1.1 plus money
purchase
Iowac
1982 65 5 1.67
2006 65; 62 (20); R88 5 2.0 1st 30 yrs; 1.0
extra yrs
Kansasc
1982 65 5 1.25
2006 65; 62 (10); R85 3 1.75
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Table 14-A1 (Continued)
State NRAf Averaging Period g Benefit Formula h
Kentuckyb
1982 65 (4); 30 yrs 5 1.6
2006 65 (4); 27 yrs 5 1.97
Louisianaa, e
1982 60 (10); 55 (25); 30 yrs 3 2.5; limit 100% FAS
2006 60 (10); 55 (25); 30 yrs 3 3.3; limit 100% FAS
Mainec, e
1982 60 3 2.0
2006 60 (5) 3 2.0
Marylandc
1982 62 (5); 30 yrs 3 0.8 to SS cap; 1.5
over cap
2006 60 (5); 30 yrs 3 1.8; limit 100% FAS
Massachusettsa, e
1982 65 (10) 3 2.5; limit 85% FAS
2006 55 (10); 20 yrs 3 0.5 to 2.5, age related
limit 80% FAS
Michigana
1982 60 (10); 55 (30) 5 1.5
2006 60 (10); 55 (30) 3 1.5
Minnesotaa
1982 65 (10); 62 (30) 5 1.0 1st 10 yrs; 1.5
extra yrs
2006 SS NRA 3 1.7
Mississippic
1982 65; 30 yrs 5 1.63 1st 20 yrs; 2.0
over 30




1982 65 (4); 60 (15) 5 1.2
2006 65 (5); 60 (15); R80 3 1.7
Montanab
1982 60 (5); 65; 35 yrs 3 1.67
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Table 14-A1 (Continued)
State NRAf Averaging Period g Benefit Formula h
Nevadac,e
1982 60 (10); 55 (30) 3 2.5; limit 75% FAS
2006 65 (5); 60 (10); 30 yrs 3 2.6; limit 75% FAS
New Hampshirec
1982 60 3 1.67 with SS offset
2006 60 3 1.67 to 65; 1.515
after 65
New Jerseyb
1982 60; 55 (25); 35 yrs 3 1.67
2006 60 3 1.82
New Mexicob
1982 60 (20); 65 (5); 30 yrs 3 3.0; limit 80% FAS
2006 60 (20); 65 (5); 25 yrs 3 3.0; limit 80% FAS
New Yorkb
1982 62 (20) 3 2.0 SS offset; max
30 yrs
2006 62 (5); 55 (30) 3 1.67 1st 20 yrs; 2.0
20–29; 3.5 yrs over
30
North Carolinad
1982 65; 30 yrs 4 1.57
2006 65 (5); 60 (25); 30 yrs 4 1.82
North Dakotab
1982 65 5 1.04
2006 65; R85 3 2.0
Ohiob, e
1982 65 (5); 30 yrs 3 2.0; limit 90% FAS




1982 62; 58 (30) 5 2.0
2006 62 (6); R90 3 2.0
Oregonc
1982 58; 55 (30) 3 1.67
2006 65; 58 (30) 3 1.5 plus money
purchase
Pennsylvaniaa
1982 60 (3); 35 yrs 3 2.0
2006 60 (3); 25 yrs 3 2.5; limit 100% high
salary
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Table 14-A1 (Continued)
State NRAf Averaging Period g Benefit Formula h
Rhode Islandd
1982 55 (30); 60 (10); 25 yrs 3 1.7 1st 10 yrs; rising
to 2.4;
limit 80% FAS
2006 60 (10); 25 yrs 3 1.7 1st 10 yrs; 1.9
2nd 10 yrs
3.0 21–34; 2.0 over
35 yrs; limit 80%
FAS
South Carolinac
1982 65; 30 yrs 3 1.25 less than
$4,800; 1.65
2006 65; 28 yrs 3 1.82
South Dakotac
1982 65 (5) 3 2.0 with SS offset
2006 60 (3); R85 3 1.625 yrs prior to
7/1/02
1.55 yrs after 7/1/02
Tennesseec
1982 60; 30 yrs 5 1.5 below SS cap;
1.75 over SS;
limit 75% FAS




1982 60 (10); 55 (30) 3 1.5 1st 10 yrs; then
2.0; limit 80% FAS
2006 60 (5); R80 3 2.3; limit 100% FAS
Utahc
1982 65 (4); 30 yrs 5 2.0; limit 100% FAS
2006 65 (4); 30 yrs 3 2.0
Vermonta
1982 65; 62 (20) 5 1.67; max 30 years
2006 62; 30 yrs 3 1.67; limit 50% FAS
Virginiac
1982 65; 60 (30) 3 1.67 with SS offset
2006 65 (5); 50 (30) 3 1.7; limit 100% FAS
Washingtonb
1982 65 (5) 5 2.0
2006 65 (5) 5 2.0
(cont.)
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Table 14-A1 (Continued)
State NRAf Averaging Period g Benefit Formula h
West Virginiab
1982 60 (5) 3 2.0
2006 60 (5); R80 3 2.0
Wisconsinc
1982 65 3 1.3; limit 85% FAS
2006 65; 57 (30) 3 1.6; limit 70% FAS
Wyomingc
1982 60 (4) 3 2.0
2006 60; R85 3 2.125 1st 15 yrs; 2.5
after
a Retirement plan covers only state employees.
b Retirement plans covers state and local employees.
c Retirement plan covers state and local employees and teachers.
d State plan covers state employees and teachers.
e State employees are not covered by Social Security.
f NRA indicates the normal retirement age for the plan. States often have several criteria
that employees can satisfy and thus qualify for unreduced pension benefits. The numbers
presented in the table indicate the age and service needed to qualify for an unreduced
pension benefit. For example, an entry of 60 (10) indicates that a worker reaching age
60 with 10 years of service has reached the normal retirement age. Some states allow
workers to qualify for unreduced benefits with a minimum number of years of service. These
requirements are shown by an entry like 30 years. Finally some states allow workers to reach
the normal retirement age with a combination of age and years of service equal to some
number such as 80. An entry of R80 indicates the NRA is reached when the worker’s age
plus years of service equal 80.
g Entries in this column indicate the number of years used to determine a worker’s final
average salary (FAS). In some states, the formula is based on the highest consecutive years
of earnings while other states include the highest years of earnings but these years must be
in the last 5 or 10 years of employment.
h The states with DB plans calculate retirement benefits by multiplying a generosity parame-
ter times the FAS times the number of years of service. Values in this column indicate the
generosity parameter in percent. Some states have formulas that are integrated with Social
Security and other states place a limit or cap on benefits, typically specified as a percent of
the final average salary.
Source : Authors’ analysis of state retirement system data; see text.
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Table 14-A2 Plan contributions and vesting requirements
State Employee Employer Vesting
Contribution Rate Contribution Rate Requirement
Alabamab
1984 5.0 7.59 10
2006 5.0 7.78 10
Alaskab, e
1984 4.25 13.62 5
2006 6.75 16.77 5
Arizonac
1984 7.0 7.0 5
2006 9.1 9.1 Immediate
Arkansasb
1984 Noncontributory 10–12 10
2006 5.0 12.54 5
Californiab
1984 5.0–9.0 16.0–21.0 5
2006 6.0 10.356 5
Coloradoc,e
1984 8.0 10.2–12.5 5
2006 8.0 10.15 5
Connecticuta
1984 Noncontributory 7.0 10
2006 2.0 5
Delawared
1984 3.0–5.0 14.4 10
2006 3.0 above $6,000 6.1 5
Floridac
1984 Noncontributory 10.93 10
2006 Noncontributory 6.72 5
Georgiaa
1984 3.0–5.0 7.75 10
2006 1.25 10.41 10
Hawaiic
1984 7.8 23.47 5
2006 6.0 13.75 5
Idahoc
1984 5.3 8.82 5
2006 6.23 10.39 5
Illinoisa
1984 4.0 13.29 8
2006 4.0 $210.5 million 8
Indianab
1984 3.0 7.5 10
2006 3.0 4.7 10
(cont.)
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Table 14-A2 (Continued)
State Employee Employer Vesting
Contribution Rate Contribution Rate Requirement
Iowac
1984 3.75 5.75 4
2006 3.7 5.75 4
Kansasc
1984 4.0 4.8 10
2006 4.0 5.27 10
Kentuckyb
1984 4.0 6.25–7.25 5
2006 5.0 5.89 5
Louisianaa, e
1984 7.0 9.2 10
2006 7.689 19.1 10
Mainec, e
1984 6.5 15.47–15.9 10
2006 7.65 15.09 5
Marylandc
1984 5.0 over SS 4.6–6.25 5
2006 2.0 9.18 5
Massachusettsa, e
1984 7.0 Pay-as-you-go 10
2006 8.3 2.9 10
Michigana
1984 Noncontributory 8.85 10
2006 Noncontributory 13.6 10
Minnesotaa
1984 3.73 3.9 10
2006 4.0 4.0 3
Mississippic
1984 6.0 8.75 10
2006 7.25 10.75 4
Missouria
1984 Noncontributory 12 10
2006 Noncontributory 12.59 5
Montanab
1984 6.0 6.417 5
2006 6.9 6.9 5
Nebraskaa
1984 3.6–4.8 156% of employee rate 5
2006 4.8 156% of employee rate 3
Nevadac, e
1984 Noncontributory 15 10
2006 10.5 10.5 5
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Table 14-A2 (Continued)
State Employee Employer Vesting
Contribution Rate Contribution Rate Requirement
New Hampshirec
1984 4.6–9.2 n/a 10
2006 6.3 6.7 10
New Jerseyb
1984 4.96–8.73 n/a 10
2006 5.0 $7.97 million 10
New Mexicob
1984 7.85 7.0–7.85 5
2006 7.42 16.59 5
New Yorkb
1984 3.0 9.2 10
2006 3.0 8.0 5
North Carolinad
1984 6.0 10.03 5
2006 6.0 2.66 5
North Dakotab
1984 4.0 5.12 10
2006 4.0 4.12 3
Ohiob, e
1984 8.5 13.71–13.95 5
2006 9.0 13.54 5
Oklahomab
1984 4.0 14.0 10
2006 3.0–3.5 11.5 8
Oregonc
1984 6.0 11.01–11.67 5
2006 8.0 8.04 5
Pennsylvaniaa
1984 6.25 15.77 10
2006 6.25 3.52 5
Rhode Islandd
1984 6.0–7.0 10.4–6.6 10
2006 8.75 14.84 10
South Carolinac
1984 4.0–6.0 7.0 5
2006 6.25 7.55 5
South Dakotac
1984 5.0 5.0 5
2006 6.0 6.0 3
(cont.)
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Table 14-A2 (Continued)
State Employee Employer Vesting
Contribution Rate Contribution Rate Requirement
Tennesseec
1984 5.0 11.07–15.01 10
2006 Noncontributory 7.3 5
Texasa
1984 6.0 8.0 10
2006 6.0 6.45 5
Utahc
1984 8.95 8.95 n/a
2006 Noncontributory 11.59–14.52 4
Vermonta
1984 5.0 10.26 10
2006 3.35 6.26 5
Virginiac
1984 5.0 6.15–8.86 5
2006 5.0 6.62 5
Washingtonb
1984 6.0 n/a 5
2006 6.0 2.25 5
West Virginiab
1984 4.5 9.5–10.5 5
2006 4.5 10.5 5
Wisconsinc
1984 5.0 6.5 Immediate
2006 5.0 4.5 Immediate
Wyomingc
1984 5.57 5.68 4
2006 5.57 5.58 4
a
Retirement plan covers only state employees.
b Retirement plans covers state and local employees.
c Retirement plan covers state and local employees and teachers.
d State plan covers state employees and teachers.
e State employees are not covered by Social Security.
Source : Authors’ analysis of state retirement system data; see text.
Notes
1 The member handbook for the New Mexico public employees’ retirement asso-
ciation (PERA 2008: 5) states: ‘New Mexico enacted legislation creating a public
employees retirement system in 1947. New Mexico was the last state in the con-
tinental United States to establish a retirement system for its public employees.’
However, this information conflicts with other secondary sources and with data
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collected by the authors in their survey of current state plan administrators;
see below.
2 ‘State welfare pensions for the elderly were practically nonexistent before 1930s’
(Social Security Administration 2008). However, the Great Depression created a
well-recognized crisis in old-age welfare, and by 1935, 30 states had adopted some
form of old-age assistance program. Although these programs were authorized
by the state legislatures, they were typically managed by the counties, and the
establishment of a plan was often a county-level option (USBLS 1931, 1932).
3 By 1961, the state employees in each of these states participated in Social Security
(Mueller 1961).
4 This statement must be qualified by the fact that as early as 1930, 21 states offered
some type of pension benefit to their teachers, who made up the single largest
group of state workers. Although teachers’ salaries were typically paid by local
school boards with some combination of state and local monies, the pensions
were administered by the states (Clark, Craig, and Wilson, 2003).
5 The authority allowing voluntary participation in Social Security by public
employees is contained in section 218 of the Social Security Act. As a result,
these state agreements are referred to as section 218 agreements. Each state’s
Social Security Administrator is responsible for managing these agreements.
6 Interestingly, legislation enacted in 1986 requires that all state and local employ-
ees hired after March 31, 1986 must be covered by Medicare; to date, no such
mandatory coverage is required for Social Security.
7 Almost three quarters of the public employees who remain outside the Social
Security system reside in just seven states: California, Ohio, Texas, Massachusetts,
Illinois, Colorado, and Louisiana.
8 State employees in Alaska were once included in Social Security; however, in
1980, Alaska withdrew its employees from the system.
9 The Pension Task Force on public pension systems reported that some plans were
terminated and restructured when public employees were first covered by Social
Security (US House of Representatives 1978).
10 In 1999, the GAO (1999) reported that 21 of the 48 states with DB plans had
considered terminating their DB plan and replacing it with a DC plan. However,
eight years later, the GAO (2007) still found only two states with DC plans.
11 A 2006 survey by the National Association of Government Defined Contribu-
tion Administrators found that on average only 21.6 percent of eligible state
employees made voluntary contributions into in these plans (GAO 2007). Likely
causes of this low level of participation are the absence of matching employer
contributions and the more generous benefits provided by primary pension
plans in the public sector.
12 Also see Munnell and Soto (2007).
13 The data in Table 14-4 are for 1984 because the 1982 report did not include
detailed information on contributions.
14 Of the 46 state plans included in the 1982 regression, 11 plans cover only state
employees, three plans cover state employees and teachers, 14 plans cover state
and local employees, and 19 plans cover state and local employees and teachers.
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In the regressions below, the dummy that represents plans for all three groups of
workers is the omitted variable.
15 For various reasons, not every state-run plan in the United States is included
in either the Wisconsin study or our data set. For example, the Wisconsin
study includes plans that cover workers other than state employees. Some states
maintain separate plans for teachers or local government workers, and there are
dozens of state-run plans that represent small, well-defined groups, such as state
judges or legislators, that are excluded (see Mitchell et al. [2000]: Table 14-2 for
a complete tabulation of systems.) In addition, in 1982 the following plans were
omitted: Indiana Public Employees’ Retirement Fund (PERF) and Teachers’
Retirement Fund (TRF) had a hybrid, 1.1 percent contribution rate combined
with a ‘money purchase’ annuity component; Nebraska School Employees Retire-
ment System (SERS) had a money purchase plan; and Oregon Public Employees
Retirement System (PERS) has 1.5 percent plus a money purchase plan. Also,
Tennessee Consolidated Retirement System (TCRS) had an ‘integrated table’
plan, and Tennessee had some information missing; thus so we used the 1984
formula. For 2006, the deleted plans include: Indiana PERF and TRF has hybrid,
‘money purchase’ option; Nebraska SERS has a money purchase plan; and Ore-
gon PERS has 1.5 percent plus a money purchase plan. For Arkansas, we used 2
percent; and for Massachusetts, we used 2.5 percent instead of 0.1–2.5 percent
age-related state formula.
16 This is not an indicator of the actuarial soundness of the state plans. However, as
Hustead an Mitchell (2000: 6) note, when it comes to the financial state of these
systems, ‘the status of public plans is not always transparent or comparable across
systems.’
17 Data are available from the authors on request.
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